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1 Introduction
Models that incorporate transaction costs generally treat them as a “useful
formalism” (Townsend 1983). They are meant to capture the costs of collecting
information, of bargaining, organization, decision making, writing and enfor-
cing contracts between individuals, firms and the state (Coase 1960). The
perception of such costs as exogenously impeding trade or inhibiting the for-
mation of complete contracts suggests that reducing, eliminating or avoiding
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those costs is generally welfare enhancing.1 As the quality of institutions is
thought to be a part of what explains those transaction costs,2 the implication
is that better institutions always improve economic outcomes.
Many of these transaction costs are not directly impeding trade, however,
but are resources allocated to technologies (or institutions) that facilitate
exchange, even though those resources could otherwise have been allocated
directly to the production of a consumption good. For example, the organization
of the firm, the formation and nature of contracts, the emergence and use of a
legal system are all themselves technologies employed to ease the conduct of
exchange. Investments in such technologies – in the form of legal or judiciary
arrangements, management consultants, and so on – are investments in an
“institutional capital”. The consequence of such investment is that the cost of
an individual exchange can be lower. For example, the expected loss from a
trade may be reduced, or it may be less costly to assess the quality of a traded
good, if we have established standardized reporting practices; an economy with
a stronger contracting environment can limit the losses from opportunistic
behaviour in trading; and so on. Moreover, the investments in exchange tech-
nologies can be private or public. Private investment in such capital could
involve the formulation of trading standards within a coalition of traders, for
example: There is an upfront cost to establishing and enforcing those standards
but these may lower intermediation costs because trading risk is reduced. Public
investment may be improvements in property rights legislation that make the
transfer of assets more secure; again, such improvements are costly but they
may reduce the costs of individual trades if it leads to fewer losses from disputed
exchanges. Each of these costs may be categorized as “transaction costs” but
they can serve quite different purposes: Some are investments that facilitate
exchange; some, such as trading risk or legal fees, are the subsequent costs of
exchange.
We develop a model in which risk-averse agents who do not know their own
production technology may, in advance of the productivity realization, form a
coalition to share consumption risk. Agents face a cost to exchange output,
however, and that cost of exchange is determined by investment in exchange
cost-reducing institutions. Total transaction costs are then the sum of two
components: There is a cost to forming the public and private institutions that
1 See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Townsend and Ueda (2006) in
relation to finance, growth and inequality; Levchenko (2007) on international trade; and Dixit
(1996) on political economy.
2 See Levchenko (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman 2007) for a
similar perspective.
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govern, ex ante, the terms of exchange, and there are costs to conducting
exchange once the state of nature is resolved.3 Agents choose the resources
allocated to reducing exchange costs and the extent of diversification (how
extensively they will trade with others).
A number of results follow from modelling transaction costs as an endogen-
ous component of a general equilibrium set-up. We first characterize the optimal
allocation. Naturally, while the costs of exchange can be too high, they can also
be too low. A high exchange cost reflects fewer resources directed towards
facilitating transactions but may be associated with greater expected utility if
those free resources are put to productive use and if agents choose to make
fewer costly exchanges. Understanding these issues is directly important for
policy design since many public institutions, such as the legal system, are
bound up in the costs of trade. Real-world policies are generally based around
simple objectives such as maximizing the size of markets or minimizing the cost
of an individual exchange. Given the absence of a framework in which to
account for the general equilibrium consequences of transaction costs, we
cannot understand the welfare-ranking of different simple policies. Having
established the optimal allocation, and since our model can be considered
quantitatively, we can conduct such an analysis.
By far the most damaging type of simple policy, in welfare terms, is one that
focuses on minimizing the costs of individual exchange. The intuition is as
follows: The optimal allocation represents a trade-off between the portion of
the endowment that goes to production (i.e., net of transaction costs) and the
amount of consumption variability. The minimum-exchange cost policy is so
damaging because it ignores both consumption variability and the overall costs
of transactions. A policy that targets market size is less damaging since it
minimizes the overall consumption variability and allows agents to respond in
their private investment decisions. The least damaging of the simple policies we
consider is a policy which minimizes the overall size of the transaction sector.
Under this policy, agents can respond to deviations from an optimal tax policy
by varying both the amount they trade and their private investments in
exchange.
In addition to policies that distort allocations to the institutional capital, we
also consider the effect of a transactions tax. Agents invest more in institutions
to ameliorate the effect of the tax on the costs of exchange, thereby making
diversification decisions less sensitive to increases in the transactions tax.
3 Throughout, an “exchange cost” is the cost of conducting a particular exchange and what we
refer to as the “transaction cost” is the sum of investments in institutions and the subsequent
costs of exchanges that occur.
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However, while apparently robust to the imposition of a transaction tax, agents
opt for autarky at a lower transaction tax than might be anticipated using a
model of exogenous transaction costs.
We can also use our quantitative model to put the empirical evidence on
transaction costs into some context. Coase (1992, 716) argues that “a large part”
of economic activity is directed at alleviating transaction costs. In a first attempt
to quantify the aggregate extent of such resources, Wallis and North (1986)
estimate that what they term the transaction sector comprised half of US GNP
in 1970, a proportion which had grown significantly over the preceding century.
Moreover, Klaes (2008) concludes that economies with less sophisticated trans-
action sectors appear, at an aggregate level, to exhibit lower levels of transaction
costs. In our model, a more wealthy economy is characterized by a smaller
transaction sector, but one based on greater investments in institutions, larger
markets and lower exchange costs. This is consistent with the evidence in Klaes
(2008), that, at a micro-level, the costs of exchange are high when the aggregate
transaction sector appears to be small.
Our framework relates to a number of other papers. The idea that invest-
ments in better transaction technologies can be part of an efficient economic
system has been put forward by De Alessi (1983), Barzel (1985) and Williamson
(1998). In making transaction costs endogenous, we are also blurring the dis-
tinction between institutional and technological efficiency, as Antras and Rossi-
Hansberg (2009) have noted in a survey on organizations and trade. In that
literature, decisions on organizational arrangements and on trade are interre-
lated. In our approach, agents make joint-decisions about their productive
capacity, risk sharing and the investments in institutions that govern the costli-
ness of trade. Finally, the gains from allocating resources to institutions relate to
the idea of a “state capacity” in Besley and Persson (2010). State capacity is
partly “legal infrastructure investments such as building court systems, educat-
ing and employing judges and registering property or credit”(p. 6). In that
model, equilibrium investments in legal capacity are increasing in national
income. Our approach also considers the possibility of a “private capacity”
that might substitute for or complement investments in public institutions.
The model is set out in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes efficient equilibria,
that is the optimal investment in institutional capital, the optimal extent of
transaction costs and the optimal market size. The conditions are discussed in
Section 4 under which the efficient equilibrium may be decentralized. Section 5
reports the implications of our model in the lights of extant empirical evidence.
Section 6 examines the impact of (simple) non-optimal institutions and also
looks at the impact of an exogenous transaction tax. Having established the
efficient allocation in Section 3, we can compute the welfare cost of each of
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these policies. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. Appendices contain some
proofs, further numerical analysis of the model and a detailed description of the
decentralized equilibrium.
2 The Model: Overview
We briefly outline the model (which is motivated by Townsend 1978) before
presenting it in detail. A large number of risk averse agents are each endowed
with the same amount of capital. That capital can be combined with a produc-
tion technology to produce a consumption good. Agents can differ in the
technology with which they can produce the consumption good but, initially,
they know only the distribution of possible technologies. Consumption risk can
be reduced by forming markets with other agents but due to exchange costs it is
not feasible to replicate a complete Arrow-Debreu allocation. The cost of each
bilateral exchange is determined in a simple way by the quality of contracting
institutions in the economy. As such, before they realise their productivity,
agents decide whether or not to form a market with other agents and, if they
do, how large that market should be and how much to invest in private (i.e.,
excludable) and public institutional quality.4
One agent per market becomes an intermediary, buying outputs and selling
consumption bundles. Intermediaries are here the productive unit of the trans-
action sector, using the institutional capital as input to a common “exchange
cost technology” (ECT), the output of which is the exchange cost incurred by
agents in its market. Ex post, agents honour their obligations even if it would be
preferable to renege. If agents do not join a market then no institutional invest-
ment takes place. The primary aim of Sections 3–4 is to characterize the efficient
level of institutional capital, exchange costs and market size (consumption risk
sharing) for such a model economy.
2.1 Preferences and Production Technology
The economy is populated by a countable infinity of agents, i 2 I. All agents
have the same utility function, u cð Þ, with a constant degree of relative risk
4 Intuitively, consider the adoption, ex ante, of standard accounting practices by a set of firms.
It is doubtless costly to establish such a framework. However, ex post, there are still costs to
running the system such as inputting data or prudential auditing.
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aversion. Each is endowed with the same amount of capital, 0 < k < 1. Agent i
produces amount λiyi of the non-storable consumption good, where yi  k is the
amount of capital used in production and λi the idiosyncratic production tech-
nology. The set of possible technologies, Λ, is finite and bounded away from
infinity. λi is distributed i.i.d. across agents with p λi
 
denoting the probability of
any agent drawing λi; and
P
λ2Λ pðλÞ ¼ 1.
Let ω represent the state of nature, i.e., a list of λi for all i 2 I. Let Ω be the
set of all possible states of nature, and p ωð Þ the probability of some ω occurring
and
Ð
ω2Ω pðωÞ ¼ 1.5
2.2 Diversification and Intermediation
To diversify against risk, agents can form markets in a star network around a
single intermediary, as in Townsend (1978). A market is a set of agents M  I
with cardinality #M < 0; so a market is finite sized. The set of agents with
whom agent i exchanges directly is denoted Ni. Agent h 2 M is an intermediary if
Ni ¼ h for i 2 Mnh and Nh ¼ Mnh. So defined, markets are disjoint and agents
only exchange with one intermediary. Mh denotes the market intermediated by
agent h 2 H where H  I is the set of all intermediaries in the economy.
Agents can exchange some of their endowment of capital on a one-for-one
basis for shares in the consumption portfolio compiled by the intermediary, less
their contributions to the total costs of transactions. Each agent in a market
exchanges twice with the intermediary and pays an equal share of market-wide
exchange costs. So for a given exchange cost, α, the per-agent cost of exchange
in a market of size #M is 2α #M1#M
 
.
2.3 Institutional Capital and Exchange Costs
Intermediaries form markets using institutional capital as an input to an
exchange cost technology (ECT) which determines the cost of exchange in that
market. There is free-entry to intermediation (i.e., the ECT is accessible to all
agents). Institutional capital takes two forms: There is a market-specific institu-
tional capital (S-capital) and a general economy-wide institutional capital
(G-capital). We assume that the specific capital is excludable to a market and
agent i allocates a proportion τis of the endowment as a private investment in this
local capital. The general capital is a public good, each an agent i making a
5 Precisely, pðωÞ is the probability of the state of nature in a small interval: occurring.
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public investment τig of the endowment. S-capital thus reflects activities specific
to the transaction being made – such as organizational choices, standardization
of quality, private infrastructures or learning about property rights – and is
excludable to the market. On the other hand, G-capital reflects the general
legal enforcement of contracts, fiduciary duties, public infrastructures or com-
petition policy and is, by contrast, a public good.
In a market intermediated by agent h, the exchange cost, αh, is determined
as follows:
αh ¼ 1 F Sh;G  k: ½1
where FðÞ is the ECT, which is concave, continuous and increasing in each of its
arguments and satisfies some Inada-type conditions.6 The range of F is the unit
interval, so 0  αh  k. Since the exchange cost is proportional to k it is akin to
an “iceberg cost”. We assume that S-capital is the average contribution of agents
in a market and G-capital is the average across the whole economy.7 Given that
all agents are identical ex ante, all will make the same allocations and so we
generally omit superscripts. Clearly, then, S  τsk and G  τgk. The ex ante
allocations, τs þ τg
 
k, combined with the ex post costs, 2α #M1#M
 
, make up
total transaction costs.
Since the intention of this paper is to explore the general equilibrium
implications of agent investments in reducing exchange costs, the equation for
the exchange cost, α, is left as a reduced-form expression. The expression for α
imposes: i) that zero ex ante spending on institutions means no trade; ii) that
greater ex ante investments reduce the costs of individual ex post trades; iii)
there are decreasing returns to investing in the institutions, and iv) zero exchange
costs require infinite investment. Nevertheless, there are a number of specific
mechanisms that may generate transaction costs in a way captured by eq. [1].
First, we may consider the transaction cost to the be product of the “transfer
of property rights” (Allen 2000, 901). That is, there are frictions associated with a
transaction because of the “costs of bookkeeping, the cost of enforcement, the
cost of monitoring…” (Townsend 1983, 259). That “cost” is related, however, to
the institutional capital from which the agents in the exchange can draw; the
form of eq. [1] imposes a natural relationship between investments in that
6 Namely: Fð0;0Þ ¼ 0 and FðS;GÞ ! 1 as fS;Gg ! f1;1g. Next, FSðS;GÞ ! 1 as S! 0, and
FSðS;GÞ ! 0 as S!1; analogous conditions obtain with respect to G. So defined, F ensures
that the “null” arrangement of zero investment in S-capital and G-capital is always equivalent to
there being no g Fð0;0Þ ¼ 0 ains from trade.
7 In other words, there is no institutional scale effect: The introduction of an agent into a market
requires an equal additional contribution to keep the exchange cost for that market constant.
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institutional capital and the consequent cost of conducting exchange. The cost
of enforcing a contract is a product of the quality of the legal system, for
example. Consider, for example, the problem of trading an item of unknown
quality. This mechanism can be motivated using an example in Langlois (2006).
Prior to the coming of the railroad to the American Midwest in the mid-nine-
teenth century, the trade of grain could be conducted on a personal basis with
quality levels maintained through the observed reputation of individual farmers.
Once the railroads vastly increased the scale of trade, individual farmer grains
became mixed and the grains were traded as commodities in a way detached
from their original producer, thus breaking the prior system of quality control. In
response, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was formed to standardize the
nature of the grain trade. Setting up such standards was costly but there were
also continuing costs of inspecting each transaction for conformance. The CBOT
reduced the risks involved in making an individual exchange of grain, reducing
the margin required by traders engaged in buying and selling grain.
A second perspective is one of incomplete contracts, i.e., that transaction
costs are “the costs of establishing and maintaining property rights” (Allen
2000, 898). Hart and Moore (2008) introduce a model in which the broad out-
lines of trade may be defined ex ante. Ex post, there are costs to fill in the detail
of the finer points. A contract embodies a trade-off between flexibility and
rigidity in which an optimal arrangement may not be fully specified over all
possible states of nature. For Hart and Moore (2008), the costs from such partial
incompleteness can take the form of a deadweight loss. We may also think of
this in the context of complexity (cf. Anderlini and Felli 1999). In the context of
our model, goods may be produced with different technologies that require
specific contracts that are complex (costly) to write. To write ex ante contracts
for each possible technology would be exorbitantly expensive, but to write no
contracts ex ante would mean that, ex post, there would be no trade. Ex ante
investments in legal and accounting systems could mean that agents are com-
mitted to trade under the rough outlines of an agreement, leaving the costs of
writing specific contracts for individual trades to be incurred after the state of
the world is known.
The distinction between the specific and general determinants of the costs of
exchange also emerges from this literature. Williamson (1979) refers to the
“governance of contractual relations”. Anderlini and Felli (1999) consider that
some of what determines the extent of complexity costs is environmental, since
a contract is “‘embedded’ in a larger legal system” (Anderlini and Felli 1999, 25).
A second determinant is specific to the market in which the contract is formed.
The distinction between S- and G-capital can also be motivated using the
example of the Chicago Board of Trade. The CBOT was established by local
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businesses, the standards were private to the CBOT and benefited the farmers
and traders that used it. However, there were also public goods that made the
CBOT effective. In 1859, for example, it obtained the authority of the State
legislature to appoint grain inspectors with powers of enforcement. Without
the public institutional input, the sector-specific arrangement may have been
less effective.
Each type of institutional capital may impact upon the other in determina-
tion of exchange costs. In our baseline case, we assume that S and G are
complementary inputs, so FSG ¼ FGS > 0. This is the form of relationship
described in connection to the CBOT: Without a public institution, the S-capital
would be less effective; without S-capital, there may be little point in an
economy-wide institution. In our robustness analysis below we also consider
the impact of their being substitutes. There is an additional form of complemen-
tarity that we will not consider: Private investments in the specific capital of one
market may not be excludable, instead benefiting other markets. For example, it
may have been that the establishment of the CBOT demonstrated the feasibility
of such an arrangement, serving as a blueprint for additional Boards elsewhere.
A version of this model with ex ante heterogeneity may naturally incorporate
such a form of investment if investments in markets composed of one type of
agent affected exchange costs in other markets also composed of that agent
type. In this model, all agents are ex ante identical and so we leave this
consideration for future work.
3 Efficient Equilibria
The purpose of this Section is to characterize efficient allocations in a coop-
erative setting; i.e., in an economy where intermediaries arise exogenously and
where there is no difficulty providing the public good, G. We subsequently
show that the efficient cooperative allocations coincide with those that are in
the core (Proposition 5), and then that competitive equilibria are Pareto opti-
mal under some conditions on the provision of G (Section 4). The intention is
to use the efficient allocation in order to quantify the welfare implications of
distortive institutional arrangements in Section 6. We can draw a number of
contrasts with Townsend (1978) before proceeding. In that paper, the optimal
cost of bilateral exchange is always zero and Townsend shows that, in the
presence of such a cost, core allocations may include finite-sized coalitions of
agents organized around a single intermediary. We use the exogenous
exchange cost model in Townsend (1978) as a starting point, but in making
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exchange costs endogenous, we need then to characterise the existence and
uniqueness of equilibria with optimally non-zero exchange cost. That also
entails establishing the existence and uniqueness of an optimal market size
given the optimal exchange costs.
An intermediary h makes an allocation for a market which is an n-tuple
f#M; fτs; τgg; α; y; ciðωÞg. The intermediary allocation is that which maximises
his own expected utility,
max
#M;τs;τg ;α
ð
ω2Ω
p ωð Þu chðωÞ  	 ½2
subject to, X
i2M
ciðωÞ 
X
i2M
λiðωÞy ½3
2αð#M  1Þ  #M ð1 τs  τgÞk  y
 
; ½4
G  τgk; ½5
S  τsk; ½6
τs þ τg  1; τs  0; τg  0; ½7
α ¼ 1 F S;Gð Þ½ k; ½8
E u ci
 jh   E u cijh0 h i "i;"h0 ; for h0 feasible: ½9
Equation [3] limits consumption to be less than or equal to output in each state
of nature, on a market-wide basis. Equation [4] says that, in any market, the sum
of endowments net of production and institutional investment must be sufficient
to cover the total of market exchange costs. Equations [5] and [6] describe
institutional capital, eq. [7] restricts the range of feasible fτs; τgg, and eq. [8]
describes the exchange cost. Finally, eq. [9] is a participation constraint requir-
ing that the utility of all agents in market h be at least as high as participating in
another feasible market. Implicit in the maximisation of eq. [2] is a participation
constraint for the intermediary; if,
X
λ2Λ
p λð Þu λk½  >
ð
ω2Ω
p ωð Þu chðωÞjh ; for all h feasible;
then no intermediated market with exchange is formed (i.e.,#M ¼ 1; τs ¼ τg ¼ 0).
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3.1 Optimality
All agents share an aliquot consumption payout in each market as determined
by the observed average technology for that market, λðω; hÞ ¼ ð#MÞ1P
i2Mh λ
iðωÞ. One more assumption is required before stating Proposition 1
which establishes that well-defined solutions to eq. [2] exist. Recall that total
per capita costs are 2α #M1#M
 
. If for all k it is the case that 1 τs  τg
 
k  2α;
then the optimal market size will be bounded since perfect diversification would
imply non-positive consumption. Hence, let an arbitrary maximum value of k be
k. Let K ; k; k where k < k; be the set of potential endowments. When k ¼ k, as
shown below, investments in ECT will be at their maximum level: τs;τg .
8
A sufficient condition for finite-sized markets to be part of the optimal plan is then,
2ð1max FðÞÞ  ð1 τs  τgÞ: ½10
Equation [10] ensures that there exists a M  #MðkÞ, where M is a finite integer
which may serve as an upper bound on optimal market size. Let M ; 1; :::; M
 
be
the set of feasible market sizes. In short, eq. [10] imposes that exchange costs do
not fall “too quickly” as institutional capital rises.
Proposition 1 For each k;ωð Þ; (i) the maximum of eq. [2] is attained and (ii) the
value function, VðkÞ; is well-defined and continuous. (iii) The optimal policy
correspondence may not be unique.
Proof. The relevant measure space is given by the triple Ω;ω; pð Þ, where ω is a
σ-algebra, the collection of all the subsets of Ω, and p is the measure defined on
ω. An agent’s expected utility is, therefore, EuðcÞ; Ðω2Ω pðωÞu c ωð Þð Þ, where the
utility function is strictly concave. Also, note that:
k 2 K  Rþþ; ½11
fτs; τgg 2 T  R2þ; ½12
#M 2 M  N: ½13
Decisions on τs; τg and #M are taken after k is known but before agents’
productivities are revealed. Using eqs [12] and [13], define the feasible policy
choices as follows: Γ : K ! T 	 M : That is, T 	 M is the product space,
½0; 12; 1
D E
; ½0; 12; 2
D E
; ½0; 12; 3
D E
; :::; ½0; 12; M
D En o
:
8 S-capital and G-capital are essentially normal goods, “purchases” of both rising in k.
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For each ω 2 Ω, Γ is clearly a non-empty, compact-valued, continuous corre-
spondence. A typical element of that mapping is denoted z 2 Γðk;ωÞ. The
optimization problem, therefore, involves a strictly concave criterion function
and a non-empty, compact constraint set, so that the maximum is attained.
Since the maximum is attained, the value function, VðkÞ; is well-defined.
It follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that VðkÞ is continuous. As the
feasible policy set is not strictly convex, the optimal policy
Gðk;ωÞ ¼ fz 2 Γðk;ωÞ : EuðcÞ ¼ VðkÞg
need not be unique. Finally, the equivalence between the cooperative case and
core allocations is established in Proposition 5. ■
Some properties of efficient equilibria are immediate. Since the ECT is freely
accessible, rents from intermediation must be zero so eqs [5] and [6] hold with
equality. The optimal allocations to the ECT is the pair τ
s ; τ


g
n o
which satisfies,
θkFS ¼ 1; ½14
θkFG ¼ 1; ½15
where θ ; 2 #M1#M
 
; and FX ðX ; S;GÞ denotes a partial derivative of F Sh;G
 
.
So, for any market size, the optimal institutional investments equate the mar-
ginal cost with the marginal gain from reducing the exchange cost. When there
are no transactions, agents would not undertake such investment and the
optimal choice of market size satisfies
arg max
θ
Euð 1 θð ÞkλÞ: ½16
Clearly, the optimal market size is unity, θ ¼ 0. The choices τs ¼ 0; τg ¼ 0 and
#M ¼ 1 also define the unique reservation utility for any agent to be a member
of any #M > 1 coalition, V ¼Pλ2Λ p λð Þu λk½ , "k: That furthermore ensure that
0  τs þ τg
 
< 1: A direct implication of the reservation value of utility is that
any equilibrium of the model in which τs > 0 and τg > 0 is one in which #M > 1,
necessarily.
Remark 1 follows from analysis of eqs [14] and [15]:
Remark 1 For #M > 1 and endowment k, eqs [14] and [15] define a unique pair,
τ#Ms ; τ
#M
g
n o
such that τ#Ms > 0 and τ
#M
g > 0. For #M ¼ 1, eqs [14] and [15] imply
τ#Ms ¼ 0 and τ#Mg ¼ 0. For a given endowment, optimal investments in the ECT rise
and bilateral exchange costs fall as the market size increases.
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The choice of any market size greater than one is determined by the ECT and
agents’ attitude to risk. Equations [14] and [15] determine efficient investment in
the ECT and hence total resources diverted from goods production. Agents’ risk
aversion provides an upper bound on how much they are willing to pay for
consumption insurance, given an alternative not to diversify; that bound is
independent of the ECT. Agents will optimally form markets with #M > 1 when
efficient investment in the ECT delivers transaction costs lower than that bound.9
The rest of the analysis of equilibrium is contained in the following four
Propositions. One can show that in general there is a critical level of k below
which transaction costs dominate and agents do not diversify:
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size is one.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ■
The key to understanding that Proposition is to recall that S ¼ τsk. So, a given τ has
a larger proportionate impact on α as k rises, even though α itself is proportional to
k. Hence, higher levels of k permit lower ex post transaction costs and help sustain
larger market sizes and the benefits from consumption risk sharing.
Proposition 2 also indicates the possibility of multiple optimal plans.
Proposition 3 now shows that no more than two such alternative plans can exist.
Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two plans.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ■
As a corollary, it follows that for any #M > 1 which is optimal, subsequent
market size increases are single steps for (sufficiently large) increases in k. The
final Proposition and following remarks establish that multiple equilibria can
arise although they are, in a sense, special cases.
Proposition 4 Let K denote the Borel sets of K  Rþþ: There exists a level of
k 2 K; call it k
, such that
Eu 1 τ1ð Þk
  θ1α1½ λ ω;Mh1
 
  ¼ Eu 1 τ2ð Þk
  θ2α2½ λ ω;Mh2 
 
9 That explains why agents may move from “autarky” (#M ¼ 1) to a market size #M > 2 for a
small change in k. This is apparent in the numerical simulations – diversification at market
sizes in between is too costly given the ECT and the degree of risk aversion. Proposition 3 shows
that subsequent increases in market size will be in steps of one.
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where τ1  τ2; α1  α2, Mh1  M
h
2 and where maximized utility is identical under
both programs.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ■
The set of values of k which result in multiple equilibria is of measure zero. That
is, such values of k
 correspond to pairs of θ
0
s; these θ
0
s are a proper subset of
the rationals and hence themselves drawn from a set of measure zero.
To summarize: Low endowment economies may resort to autarky
(Proposition 2). However, for economies with larger endowments (k > k) it is
optimal to invest in the ECT and to form markets (Proposition 1 and Remark 1).
Equilibrium plans need not be unique (Proposition 4) but those equilibria are, in
a sense, of limited interest (Proposition 3 and the brief discussion following
Proposition 4). Finally:
Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with core
allocations.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ■
4 Equilibrium with Competitive Intermediation
The question now is: Can the efficient outcome be decentralized? First, note that
given the public good nature of the G-capital, there is a free-riding problem
associated with investment in G-capital:
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. ■
There are a number of ways in which the public good problem inherent in G may
be addressed. The simplest is to suppose that a state institution exists and is
capable of enforcing a tax rate. In the absence of any rent seeking that institu-
tion can deliver the optimal tax rate. However, given that our economy has free-
entry to private, coalition-level provision of specific capital, we may think of a
public analogue to that in terms of competitive provision of a public good.
In particular, suppose that there is free-entry to the public, economy wide
provision of general institutional capital. While there is no ex ante political
conflict here, there may be a need to establish a mandate for a public institution
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to tax all agents equally even though individual agents may not wish to follow
through in that way. This is reminiscent of the arguments of Schumpeter
(1942, 269), who asserted that political markets work in much the same way as
do competitive economic markets: “(T)he democratic method is that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” These
arguments were later echoed forcefully by Wittman (1989).10
We formalize this perspective and consider the outcome to be the result of a
market with free-entry: Any agent can costlessly seek a mandate that specifies
taxes for all agents and the level of G-capital to be provided. The successful
mandate is that with the largest share of votes and is, we assume, then enforced
ex post.11 Proposition 7 shows that such competition then yields an efficient
outcome; the competitive G provision will be G
 ¼ τ
gk.
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable tax plan then all agents
will be taxed according to eq. [15]. It follows that G ¼ G
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. ■
There is no such problem in the provision of S-capital as free-entry to inter-
mediation (i.e., any agent may become an intermediary) ensures that all rents
are competed away. In Appendix A.3 the decentralized economy is studied. It is
established that there exists a unique, Pareto-optimal allocation in each market
with a unique intermediary in each market.
Proposition 8 If the public good is provided according to Proposition 7, the provision
of S-capital and G-capital is Pareto optimal in the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. ■
5 The Size of the Transaction Sector
The empirical literature on transaction costs has focused on the costs of indivi-
dual transactions or individual organizational arrangements. Insofar as they can
10 Wittman (1989, 1395–6) argues “…that democratic political markets are organized to pro-
mote wealth-maximizing outcomes, that these markets are highly competitive and that political
entrepreneurs are rewarded for efficient behavior.”
11 So we invoke ex ante perfect competition and ex post monopoly in the process of allocating
a mandate. Relaxation of either assumption might provide a focus for understanding the
existence and power of elites.
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be measured, the size of such costs is considered a measure of the working of
the market. Examples in a variety of different contexts, from property rights to
finance, are noted in Allen (2000). In contrast to the study of individual transac-
tions, there has been limited work to establish the size of transaction costs on
aggregate. Wallis and North (1986) were the first to quantify the size of the US
transaction sector. By dividing occupations into those classified as providing
“transaction services” to firms and those that provide primarily “transformative”
services, Wallis and North calculate the total remuneration to transaction occu-
pations. This sum constitutes the size of the transaction sector. They found that
in 1870, the transaction sector accounted for 25% of GNP, rising to 50% in
1970.12 The Wallis and North methodology has been applied to Australia
(Dollery and Leong 2002), Bulgaria (Chobanov and Egbert 2007) and New
Zealand (Hazledine 2001) with similar magnitudes and trends found in each.
We thus have two observations from different empirical literatures on trans-
action costs: First, the size of the transaction sector is large and positively
related to wealth; and, second, low transaction costs are one of the spurs of
development.13 The model presented here offers a natural way to consider both
observations and to suggest directions for future empirical work. As we have
defined them, transaction costs are composed of the costs of making individual
exchanges and the investments in exchange institutions. Our model, then,
hinges on a distinction between ex ante and ex post costs which is not a focus
of empirical study. However, we take the empirical evidence on individual
arrangements to reflect an individual ex post exchange cost (α) in the model.
While the aggregate evidence will likewise capture the ex post exchange cost, it
will also include resources allocated to exchange cost-reducing activities. We
can draw some tentative comparisons between the model implications and the
data, therefore. However, one of the implications of this framework is that if
empirical work accounted for both components of total transaction costs, the
evidence presented by Wallis and North (1986) may be more fully understood.
We let κ measure the size of the transaction sector (the proportion of the
endowment not allocated to the production of the consumption god):
κ ; ðk  yÞ=k ¼ τs þ τg þ θ 1 F S;Gð Þ½  ½17
12 The transaction sector appears to be important in other advanced economies. See Wang
(2003) and Klaes (2008) for surveys.
13 Consider the conclusions in Klaes (2008): “…economies with less well-developed transaction
sectors appear to exhibit lower levels of transaction costs if those costs are measured in terms of
sector size, whereas micro-structurally those economies in fact suffer from higher levels of
transaction costs due to significant barriers to smooth exchange and coordination of economic
activity.”
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Some comparative static results are intuitive. Suppose that at some k, the optimal
market size is #M
0
> 1; κ is necessarily higher at any #M
00
> #M
0
since otherwise
an equilibrium with lower transaction costs and better risk-sharing properties is
available. The higher is k, the lower is κ for any given market size since agents
invest more to reduce the costs of exchange (see Appendix A.4). These results may
be compared with those of Besley and Persson (2010) who find equilibrium
investments in “legal capacity” increase with national income. As k increases,
then, the cost of further diversification approaches the additional consumption-
smoothing gain and for a sufficiently large increase in k optimal market size
increases.14 Figure 1 summarizes results from a numerical version of the model
(see Appendix A.5).15 One finds that optimal transaction costs can be substantial;
that large part of market activity referred to by Coase (1992) is reflected in our
simple general equilibrium framework.
Proportionate investments in institutions can increase in k, as Figure 1
demonstrates;16 while the number of exchanges increases and institutional
investment grows, total transaction costs ultimately fall (although the relation
is non-monotonic). In other words, a wealthier economy has a larger and more
sophisticated transaction sector, one based on greater investments in contracting
institutions, larger markets and lower exchange costs. Empirically, the payoff
from the greater investments – lower costs of individual exchanges – is difficult
to identify in sectoral analyses which then mistake the higher investments in
institutions as higher transaction costs overall. What appears to be obscured in
the Wallis and North analysis is the distinction between ex ante investments in
institutional capital and the ex post cost of conducting exchange; empirical
analyses which make that distinction would appear worthwhile.
These numerical results are robust to varying a number of different parameters,
as shown in Appendix A.5. The coefficient or relative risk aversion drives the extent
of diversification but, so long as it does not shut down all exchange, its impact on
fτs; τgg and so κ; is limited. The baseline relative risk aversion is γ ¼ 3 and at k ¼ 30,
optimal #M ¼ 18 while τs ¼ 0:0484, τg ¼ 0:0616 and κ ¼ 0:4930. Increasing the
risk aversion parameter to 3.5 results in #M ¼ 75 and τs ¼ 0:0507, τg ¼ 0:0684 and
κ ¼ 0:5100: Reducing the risk aversion parameter to 2.5 causes all exchange to stop
14 Proposition 3 shows that market size must increase by one from any #M > 1; and the
discussion preceding Proposition 2 explains how market size can jump by more than one
when moving from #M ¼ 1.
15 We adopt an ECT with constant elasticity of substitution of 2 whilst agents have a coefficient
of relative risk aversion of 3. For Figure 1 we allow the effectiveness of S-capital and G-capital to
differ slightly, although none of our results are sensitive to this assumption. See Appendix
Table 2 for details.
16 Appendix A.4 identifies a sufficient condition on the ECT for that to be the case.
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(i.e., optimal #M ¼ 1); with γ ¼ 2:5; endogenous exchange occurs at k ¼ 32:3.
A further robustness is to consider the efficacy of the allocations to the institutional
capital. In the baseline numerical simulations, the contributions τsk and τgk are both
weighted by a parameter β ¼ 0:03. Increasing the parameter makes the exchange
cost lower for a given institutional capital. At β ¼ 0:035, the optimal#M ¼ 30 while
τs ¼ 0:0499, τs ¼ 0:0666 and κ ¼ 0:4845; the more effective is institutional capital,
the higher are the optimal allocations, the larger aremarkets and the lower is the size
of the total transaction cost. A final robustness is to consider the assumption of
complementarity between S and G capital. In the baseline we set the CES coefficient
to s ¼ 2. If we modify this to s ¼ 1; then optimal #M ¼ 19 while τs ¼ 0:0503,
τg ¼ 0:0595 and κ ¼ 0:4935:
6 The Impact of Non-optimal Public Institutions
So far the analysis has focused on the nature of efficient equilibria; the efficient
tax level, τ
g ; provides an optimal trade-off between the expected level of
consumption and its variability. This Section considers the impact of distortive
Figure 1: Equilibrium over a range of the endowment.
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(i.e., non-optimal) levels of the tax, τg .
17 First, we look at constrained optimal
decisions about τs and #M over a range of imposed tax rates. Second, we
consider the welfare implications of various transaction cost policies. Third,
we model the impact of a tax on transactions.
6.1 Equilibrium with Exogenous τg
The distortive behaviour centres on the resources turned over to G-capital via the
tax τg . Such distortions might reflect deeper political tensions, perhaps between
the electorate and a “political class”. In an environment where the definition
and measurement of the costs of exchange are not well understood, it may also
be simply that the objective of tax policy is not straightforward to design.
Alternatively, deviations from optimality may reflect “irrational” voters, as in
Caplan (2008). First, we look at the consequence of varying τg over some
interval. In SubSection 6.2, we look at particular policy objectives that may
drive specific deviations.
Figure 2 reports the consequences of varying τg over the interval ½0;0:4.
Responses in τs and #M are unconstrained but can be, of course, affected by
deviations in τg from its efficient level. This can result in significant compensat-
ing changes in agent behaviour, as Figure 2 shows. When τg deviates from τ
g
agents can respond by changing τs and/or market size. If market size does not
change, then τs varies positively with τg . This follows from eq. [14] and the
assumption that S and G are complementary inputs; a higher G increases the
marginal return to S-capital investment. For a sufficiently large increase in τg,
the constrained optimal choice of market size may also change by increasing or
decreasing. Increasing τg holding #M fixed clearly reduces net endowment
since the optimal τs also increases. One response is to recover some lost pro-
ductive capacity by reducing the number of exchanges (lower #M). Another
response is to take advantage of the lower exchange cost created by the higher
τg and diversify further (higher #M). For this parameterization, market size is
hump-shaped in the level of τg: At low levels of τg ; there remains a substantial
residual endowment and so the gain from additional risk-sharing dominates: A
sufficiently large increase in τg lowers the exchange cost such that increasing
market size (further risk-sharing) is attractive enough to incur the cost of a
17 In this section S-capital and G-capital are equally efficient in reducing transaction costs so
any difference between τs and τg reflects the institutional distortion. Specifically,
γs ¼ γg ¼ 0:075 and k ¼ 30. All other parameters are as in Appendix Table 2 unless otherwise
stated.
Transaction Costs and Institutions 409
Brought to you by | University of St Andrews Scotland
Authenticated | alex.trew@st-andrews.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 11/9/15 5:26 PM
higher κ. However, for τg  τ
g the residual endowment is severely diminished.
Diverting additional resources away from production is more costly than the
gain from further diversification; as such, market size and τs both fall because
that is the only way to reduce κ.
At very low levels of τg, exchange costs are so high that no diversification is
worthwhile (agents set τs ¼ 0 and #M ¼ 1). When τg is very high, the loss to
productive capital is such that no diversification with τs ¼ 0 and #M ¼ 1 is
better than some diversification with the small residual endowment, even
though the endowment are still being taxed. In short, market size is hump-
shaped in τg and, for some low and high values of τg, agents optimally choose
not to diversify. The general pattern of robustness to parameters discussed in the
previous section holds with regard to the effect of distortive institutions; in
particular, the non-monotonic responses of τs and #M to changes in τg holds
across a range of endowment levels and risk aversion parameters. The non-
monotonicity of #M is also robust to making S and G capital input-substitutes in
the exchange cost technology, although the relationship between τs and τg is, of
course, negative when we assume they are substitutes (aside from increases in τs
that result from increasing #M).
Figure 2: Equilibrium with distortive institutions.
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Given that Section 11 has established the efficient outcome, we can calculate
the consumption equivalent loss for each level of τg relative to that efficient
frontier. In particular, if uτ
0
g is the utility obtained under policy τ0g, then the
percentage loss in consumption that is equivalent to moving from τ
g to τ
d
g can be
calculated as
h
1 u1 ðuτdg Þ=u1ðuτ
g Þ
i
	 100: As Figure 3 shows, deviation in τg
from its optimal level can have significant welfare costs. A τg that is 0.05 higher
than optimal is equivalent to a 2.7% drop in consumption; a τg that is 0.15 higher
than optimal is equivalent to a 15.1% drop in consumption.
6.2 Specific Transaction Cost Policies
The discussion of the empirical evidence above points to the complexity of
classifying and measuring transaction costs in reality. In the light of that, it is
reasonable to consider an environment where the optimal tax policy is unclear.
The literature on transaction cost economics suggests that optimality is where
“transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a (mainly)
transaction cost economizing outcome” (Williamson 2010, 681). The interpreta-
tion of that optimality condition in terms of policy may be complicated since
there are multiple observable and potentially non-observable components: The
number of exchanges (market size), the investments in reducing the cost of
exchange, and the cost of exchange itself. As such, a policy maker may have
as its objective some minimum or maximum of each of these and think it a
reasonable interpretation of what is optimal: First, institutions could deliver zero
exchange costs; second, institutions should maximise risk-sharing; third, the
Figure 3: Welfare costs of distortionary institutions.
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cost of individual exchanges should be minimized18; and, fourth, institutions
should minimize the size of the transaction sector as a whole.
In our model, zero exchange costs are not feasible; institutions which
deliver an infinite number of trades at zero cost are themselves infinitely costly.
However, the analysis above shows that we can consider the second, third and
fourth type of policy prescription. The second is a rule that maximizes the
(constrained optimal) choice of market size; the third minimizes the cost of
individual exchanges; the fourth minimizes size of the transaction sector. The
market size policy is given by,
τMg :¼ min τg j#M  #M
0
n o
and τs optimal
o
:
n
½18
That is, τMg is the lowest tax required to induce the maximum market size, given
that agents optimally choose market size and τs in response to τg : The tax that
minimizes the exchange cost is given by,
ταg :¼ min fαj#M > 1 and τs optimalg: ½19
Finally, the tax policy which minimizes the transaction sector is given by,
τκg :¼ min fκj#M > 1 and τs optimalg: ½20
For each policy the percentage change in certainty equivalent consumption is
calculated using the efficient frontier established in Section 3. Table 1 describes
various features of equilibrium under the different rules.
None of the rules are optimal in a framework with endogenous transaction costs;
the τMg rule delivers too little directly productive capital and τ
κ
g too much con-
sumption variability. The ταg rule delivers a worse outcome in both regards.
Under the ταg rule, the policy to minimize individual exchange costs involves
Table 1: The effects of distortive institutions.
Rule #M κ τg τs α %C
τ
g  . . . . –
τMg  . . . . .
ταg  . . . . .
τκg  . . . . .
18 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this policy.
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setting the tax to the highest level without shutting down all exchange, regard-
less of the effect on total transaction costs or on the amount of consumption
variability. The economy is pushed toward low-market size (high consumption
variability) and low productive capital. This results in a consumption equivalent
loss far in excess of the other rules. Nonetheless, it is useful to analyse which of
τMg and τ
κ
g is the more costly, and why. Consider first the τ
M
g rule. Larger markets
means, in short, higher taxation to lower the costs of bilateral exchange. The
transaction sector is larger as a whole and its composition has shifted toward ex
ante investments. τg cannot increase by too much, however, since agents always
have the option of shifting resources to goods production by reducing market
size and τs: For the τκg rule, minimizing transaction costs requires exchange costs
to be too high. A low τg means that agents optimally form smaller markets and
make smaller investment in S-capital, both actions reducing κ.
The loss from τMg is greater than that from τ
κ
g, but both are eclipsed by the τ
α
g
rule.19 Expected utility is a product of the portion of the endowment that is
productive (1 κ) and the amount of consumption variability (#M). The extreme
costliness of the ταg rule results from neglecting both of these. In this sense, our
distinction between the costs of exchange and the total costs of the transaction
sector is particularly important: An apparently sensible policy to minimize the
costs of exchange, while neglecting the resources required to obtain that mini-
mization, is highly distortive. The comparison between τMg and τ
κ
g is also infor-
mative: Institutions fostering smaller exchange costs and bigger markets appear
to be the more damaging in welfare terms. By targeting market size, the govern-
ment “distorts” choices of both #M and τg ; leaving agents, in effect, with only
one instrument to respond, τs. The alternative τκg; which minimizes the sum of all
resources allocated to transactions, leaves private agents with the choice of
market size and τs: The option for agents simply to consume their own endow-
ment constrains policy such that the outcome is not too far from that which
maximizes expected utility. That additional flexibility appears to reflect some of
the empirical findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). That paper finds that
bad property rights institutions are more damaging that contracting institutions
since individuals can respond to contractual distortions by using a variety of
formal and informal mechanisms. In the case of this model, agents can respond
via choice of τs and market size in the face of the τκg rule, but have only a limited
range of response in the case of the τMg rule.
19 This welfare ranking is robust to a wide range of different endowment levels (numerical
comparisons over k 2 ð0; 35 all satisfy this ranking). It is also robust to assuming that S and G
are input substitutes.
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6.3 Transaction Taxes
Policies are sometimes designed to address the negative externalities from trade
(such as trades of a pollutive item), or to raise revenue from a sector characterized
by high-frequency trading (as in a Tobin-type tax). In such policies, individual
exchanges are taxed. The European Commission analysis of its proposed Financial
Transaction Tax (FTT), for example, finds “in a nutshell… very positive impacts on the
functioning of the single market for financial instruments” (European Commission
2013, 16). The consequences of such a tax are not necessarily obvious; however, since
agents may respond by increasing investment in private exchange cost reduction or
may dramatically change the number of trades. Moreover, the robustness of a market
to the imposition of a tax, i.e., its revenue-generating ability, may not be fully
understood since those markets may shut down or relocate to avoid the tax.
In order to understand the impact of a transaction tax, we need a framework
in which the nature of trade (i.e., the number of exchanges and investments in
the cost of exchange) is endogenous. As such, our model can form a basis for a
preliminary analysis of transaction taxes. We can consider a tax, t > 0, that
simply makes individual exchanges more costly,
α ¼ ð1þ tÞ 1 F S;Gð Þ½ k: ½21
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of a transaction tax where transaction costs are
endogenous (solid line). Agents respond first by increasing investments in
institutions in order to dampen the effect of the tax on the cost of exchange.
Relative to an environment where transaction costs are exogenous (dashed
line),20 market size is more robust to the introduction of a transaction tax. In
each environment, agents can avoid the tax by simply resorting to autarky,
recovering the investment in exchange and avoiding all tax, whenever the
participation constraint is no longer satisfied. The important difference when
transaction costs are endogenous is that agents have individually allocated a
portion of their endowment to support institutions; in the exogenous case this
investment has not occurred and so cannot be retrieved by agents. That means
that although agents initially appear less affected by the tax, they will opt for
autarky at a level of the tax far lower than that suggested when transaction costs
are considered exogenous.21 The implication for transaction tax policy is that,
20 The exogenous transaction cost set-up fixes α and the net endowment such that the
equilibrium when t ¼ 0 is the same as that in the endogenous transaction cost environment
(i.e., τg and τs are fixed at the values which are optimal for t ¼ 0).
21 With endogenous transaction costs, autarky occurs at 6.6%; if we take them to be exogenous,
the autarky equilibrium is induced at 22.2%. Although these thresholds vary, this differential
impact is robust across the different parameterizations discussed in the previous subsections.
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while markets respond as would be expected to the imposition of a tax by
reducing market size, agents will resort to autarky earlier than may expected if
the individual agents’ own investments in that exchange are not taken into
account. In case of the FTT, for example, this may mean that a transaction tax
leads to the shifting of financial activities to geographies outwith the FTT’s
jurisdiction at much lower levels of the tax than may be anticipated. Revenues
from such a tax may fall short of projections.
We can again calculate the losses from imposing a tax on transactions.
Figure 5 depicts losses associated with Figure 4. A 5% transaction tax leads to
3.7% consumption equivalent loss in both the exogenous and endogenous
Figure 4: The effects of a transaction tax.
Figure 5: Welfare costs of transaction taxes.
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cases, which is somewhat higher than an equal deviation in the τg . An increase
in τg above optimum is at least reducing exchange costs; imposing a tax on
exchange means that, even if agents can respond with higher τs and lower
market size, the cost of exchange is increasing. In the case where agents can
respond by removing their own investments in reducing exchange costs, the
consumption equivalent loss is capped at 4.9% once the transaction tax induces
no exchange.
7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Economists are increasingly focusing on the role of good institutions in
promoting growth, trade and other desiderata. The intention of this paper
is to link in a simple way impediment to transactions, institutional quality
and market size. The efficient equilibrium of the model is consistent with
significant transaction costs and investments in institutions. A distinction
between transaction costs and exchange costs was made. The impact of
distortive institutions was also considered, although in a tentative and
ultimately ad hoc way. We argued that a number of what might be thought
of as “good” institutions is actually sub-optimal when transaction costs are
endogenous.
It would seem important to extend the analysis in a number of directions.
First, although agents had different productive capabilities, this had a limited
impact as decisions over τs and τg were made before types were revealed. If
decisions over τs and τg were made after agents’ productive capabilities were
known (and capabilities are private information) then the analysis will be some-
what more complicated. Related to this, incentive compatibility issues were not
to the fore because it was assumed that agents remained in markets even if, ex
post, they might have been better off under autarky. Nevertheless, the frame-
work developed above may prove useful in the analysis of optimal tax and the
role of government.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 3 Propositions
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size is one.
Proof. To the contrary, assume that
Eu 1 τs  τg
 
k  θα λ ω;Mh    Eu λik ; ½22
for all k: All variables on the left-hand side reflect optimizing decisions. Note, in
particular, that θ > 1;"k: Observe that as k ! 0; 1 τs  τg
  θð1 FðÞÞ !
ð1 θÞ < 0, and that V is positive for all k > 0. Thus, there exists a level of k;
call it k, such that
lim
k!k
Eu 1 τs  τg
 
k  θα λ ω;Mh  ! 0;
As k ! k, the inequality in eq. [22] is reversed. ■
Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two plans.
Proof. Let k
 denote a value of k such that EuðP1jk
Þ ¼ EuðP3jk
Þ ¼ Vðk
Þ:
Assume that there also exists a P2 such that EuðP1jk
Þ ¼ EuðP2jk
Þ ¼ EuðP3jk
Þ: Let
τ3 > τ2 > τ1; θ3 > θ2 > θ1:
Now, denote
θ3 ¼ xy ; θ2 ¼
p
q
; θ1 ¼ mn ; ½23
where x; y; p; q; m and n are all positive integers. Define χ as follows:
χ ¼
p
q xy
m
n  xy
:
By assumption pq  xy < 0; mn  xy < 0, and pq mn < 0, so 1  χ  0: Finally, note
that q ¼ pþ 1, n ¼ mþ 1 and y ¼ x þ 1. Thus
p
q
¼ pðpþ 1Þ
1  xðx þ 1Þ1
mðmþ 1Þ1  xðx þ 1Þ1
" #
m
n
þ mðmþ 1Þ
1  pðpþ 1Þ1
mðmþ 1Þ1  xðx þ 1Þ1
" #
x
y
; ½24
that is, market size associated with P2 is a weighted average of the other two
optimal market sizes. Hence it follows, by the strict concavity of the utility
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function, that either: (i) P2 is indeed an optimal plan and P1 and P3 are not; or,
(ii) P2 is optimal and identical to either P1 or P3; or, (iii) P2 ¼ P1 ¼ P3: ■
Proposition 4 Let Kdenote the Borel sets of K  Rþþ: There exists a level of
k 2 K; call it k
, such that
Eu 1 τ1ð Þk
  θ1α1½  λ ω;Mh1
 
  ¼ Eu 1 τ2ð Þ k
  θ2α2½  λ ω;Mh2 
 
where τ1τ2; α1α2, Mh1M
h
2 and where maximized utility is identical under both
programs.
Proof. Let k 2 ½k; k: Partition that set into ½k; k^Þ and ðk^; k such that
the max Euð j"k < k^Þ < max Euð j"k > k^Þ, and where τðk > k^Þ > τðk < k^Þ;
#Mðk > k^Þ > #Mðk < k^Þ: By Proposition 2, such a partition is possible; it is
also implied by eqs [14] and [15]. Let k1f g denote any sequence in ½k; k^Þ
converging to k^ and let k2f g be any sequence in ðk^; k converging to k^. Let
V1(k1) denote sup Euðjk 2 k; k^ÞÞ, V2ðk2Þ denote sup Euðjk 2 ðk^; kÞ and V^ðk^Þ
denote sup Euðjk1 ¼ k^Þ. By Proposition 1 these value functions are well defined
and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, continuous. Hence, there exists a δ such
that for k1  k^
  < δ=2 and k2  k^  < δ=2 one has that,
V1ðk1Þ  V^ðk^Þ
  < "=2;
V2ðk2Þ  V^ðk^Þ
  < "=2:
Hence
V1ðk1Þ  V2ðk2Þ
   V1ðk1Þ  V^ðk^Þ þ V2ðk2Þ  V^ðk^Þ 
 "=2þ "=2
¼ ":
for k1; k2 close to k^ market size will not be changing. Hence, market size and
taxes are higher for all k 2 ðk^; k compared with k 2 ½k; k^Þ: Expected utility is
identical with different optimal plans at k
 ¼ k^. ■
Following Townsend (1978) and Boyd and Prescott (1985) one may characterize
core allocations directly. In the discussion of the efficient equilibrium in the main
text we studied the equilibrium decision rules of an intermediary. Townsend (1978)
labelled that analysis the “cooperative” solution. Hence, the equivalence of the
core and cooperative solutions is now established, Proposition 5 in the text.
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Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with core
allocations.
Proof. Consider the unique equilibrium: xh ¼ fc
; y
; τ
;#M
; i 2 Mhg for all
h 2 H. This n-tuple determines F S
;G
ð Þ and hence α
. Suppose a strict subset
of agents in the market intermediated by h; B  Mh, can form a blocking
coalition (i.e., market). The cooperative equilibrium necessitates that the block-
ing coalition cannot deviate from contributing τ
g on average. The blocking
intermediary chooses τBs given the market size #B < #M
h. The agents in the
blocking coalitions are better off with the following program:
ci ¼ c; τig ¼ τ
g; "i 2 B;
1 ¼ 2 #B 1
#B
 
kFS SB;G

 
:
The consumption profile follows from optimizing over agents with identical,
strictly concave utility functions and the second condition was derived in the
text. By Remark 1, SB-capital is strictly lower and exchange costs strictly higher.
There are fewer transactions in this proposed market but each is more costly. In
addition, the investment portfolio is less diversified. Given that market size and
investment in -capital deviate from the optimum, it must be that the higher
exchange cost and less diversification are not compensated by fewer transac-
tions; expected utility is necessarily lower. Now consider the case B  M: The
same argument applies: In this proposed market, exchange costs are strictly
lower and investments higher. The deviation from first-best means S that
expected utility must be lower than in market M. Hence, the cooperative alloca-
tion is in the core. Further, since the core is non-empty and #M is the unique
optimal market size, it follows that the core allocations and the allocations of the
cooperative economy coincide. ■
A.2 Proofs of Section 4 Propositions
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which τig ¼ 0 " i 2 I, so that G ¼ 0. By
Proposition 2, for k big enough, there is a positive level of S-capital that is
optimal, τis ¼ τ

s , " i 2 I; EUi ¼ EU0 denotes expected utility under this plan.
Suppose a blocking coalition B exists such that an agent b 2 B proposes τbg > 0
for i 2 B. If #B < 0, then obtains and it G ¼ 0 follows that EUi < EU0 for all
i 2 B Suppose, however that #B ¼ 0 and that an agent b 2 B proposes τbg > 0
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for i 2 B. In that case G ¼ Gb > 0. Since #B > 0; some positive level of G is
optimal, and so EUi > EU0 for each i 2 B. But now there exists a blocking
coalition B
0  B in which some agent b0 2 B0 proposes τb0g ¼ 0 for each i 2 B
0
.
Since #B
0
<0 it remains the case that G ¼ Gb. Therefore, EUi (for i 2 B0 Þ must
be greater than EUi (for i 2 BÞ. So while there can exist blocking coalitions
which propose τbg > 0 for some i 2 B, they are not in the core; “voluntary”
contributions to G-capital are zero. ■
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable tax plan then all agents
will be taxed according to eq. [15]. It follows that G ¼ G
.
Proof. Suppose that a group of agents V  I each seek a mandate for their
proposals. Let G ¼ τgk: The proposal Mg ¼ ffτiggi2I jG  Gg of each agent g 2 V
includes taxation levels for each agent i 2 I as well as a proposed level of
G-capital, G  G. Agent i votes for the tax plan that will provide her with the
highest expected utility; EUijg0 is the expected utility to agent i if agent g
0
holds
the mandate to tax. Vg
0
denotes the set of agents who vote for the tax plan of
agent g
0
: So, if #Vg
0
> #Vg
00
for every g
00 2 Vng 0 , then agent g0 holds the
mandate to tax, imposes taxation levels and delivers the level of G-capital in
return. In the core, all agents are taxed equally and no rents accrue: G ¼ G.
Consider the alternative to this. If an agent g
0 2 V offers a tax plan
Mg0 ¼ ffτig0 ¼ τ 0ggi2I jG
0g in which τ 0gk > G
0
there is some other agent g
00 2 V
who offers a plan Mg00 ¼ ffτig00 ¼ τ 0ggi2I jG
00 g in which τ 0gk > G
00
> G0 which deli-
vers #Vg
00
> #Vg
0
. Given free entry to proposing a tax plan, the rent from
holding the mandate is driven to zero, so that agent g
; who sets τ
g to satisfy
eq. [15], ensures that G ¼ G ¼ G
. ■
A.3 Proof of Proposition 8
The equivalence of core and competitive equilibria is established by extending the
arguments of Townsend (1978). First, some notation is developed. Let any agent
h 2 I propose strategy Ph for intermediating in a market. This strategy has eight
components: Mh is the market proposed by agent h; Ph1 is the yield in terms of the
consumption good of one share in the portfolio of agent h; Ph2 is the price in terms
of the capital good at which agent h is willing to buy an unlimited number of
shares in the goods production of any agent inMh; Ph3 is a fixed fee in terms of the
capital good for the purchase of shares in the portfolio of agent by i 2 Mh; Ph4 is
the price in terms of the capital good at which agent h is willing to sel h l an
unlimited number of shares in her portfolio to agents inMh; τhs is the proportion of
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the capital endowment that agent h proposes to invest in S-capital for that market;
τhg is similarly defined. Recall that with free political entry agent g

 delivers on the
manifesto promise and ensures that G ¼ G. Finally, αh Fð Þ is the ex post exchange
cost. It is not strictly necessary to include αh Fð Þ in the definition of the strategy
space but it aids intuition to do so. In what follows, QihD is the quantity of shares
purchased by i in h’s portfolio, whilst QhiS is the quantity of shares sold by i to h:
Aih is a switching function, where Aih ¼ 1 if agent i buys shares in the portfolio of
intermediary h, and Aih ¼ 0 otherwise. One may characterize the optimal strate-
gies for intermediaries and non-intermediaries for a given market size. The follow-
ing unconstrained optimization delivers the supporting price vector. Finally, we
reduce on notation by writing x when we really mean xðωÞ.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of actions QijS
;Q
ji
D
;A
ij


n o
and a
strategy Pi
 ¼ Mi
;Pi1
;Pi2
;Pi3
;Pi4
; τis
; τig
; αi
ðFÞ
n o
for each agent i 2 I (where for
any variable x; the convention xii ¼ 0 is adopted), an allocation ci
; yi
; i 2 I

 
and
a set of markets which satisfy:
1. If agent i is not an intermediary (QjiD
 ¼ 0;"j 2 I) then yi
;QijS
;QjiD
;Aih
 ;
n
τhis
; τ
hi
g
; α
hi

 ðFÞg maximizes eq. [25] subject to eqs [26], [27] and [28] and
Ph ¼ Ph
 "hi: ci
 is given by eqs [27], and given eqs [30] – [33].
2. Agents participate in, at most, one market, M. In each market there is
one intermediary such that h 2 M; Mh
 ¼ M; and τihs ; τihg ; αihðFÞ
n o
¼
τihs
; τ
ih
g
; α
ih

 ðFÞ
n o
: For each i 2 Mnh; Aih ¼ 1: For every such h; Ph is fea-
sible, with yh chosen to maximize eq. [29] subject to eqs [30] and [31]. ch

is given by eq. [31].
3. There exist no blocking strategies for any agent of I.
Hence, a non-intermediary faces the following problem:
max
QihD ;Q
hi
S ;y
i;Aih
X
h:i2Mh
Aih
 
EU QihDP
h
1 þ yiλi  QhiS λi
  
; ½25
subject to the following constraints regarding feasibility and participation,
X
h:i2Mh
Aih
  ð1 τhs  τhgÞki þ QhiS Ph2  QihDPh4  Ph3  αðFhÞ  yi 
" #
 0; ½26
ciðωÞ ¼
X
h:i2Mh
Aih
 
QihDP
h
1 ðωÞ þ yiλiðωÞ  QhiS λiðωÞ
 " #  0;"ω 2 Ω; ½27
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Aih ¼ 1) Aij ¼ 0;"i such that i 2 Mj;"jh: ½28
An intermediary chooses a strategy to maximize,
max EU yhλh þ
X
i2Mh
QhiS λ
i  QihDPh1
  !
; ½29
subject to,
ð1 τhs  τhgÞkh  αðFhÞ #M  1ð Þ  yh þ
X
i2Mh
QihDP
h
4 þ Ph3  QhiS Ph2
 " #  0; ½30
chðωÞ ¼
X
i2Mh
QhiS λ
iðωÞ  QihDPh1 ðωÞ
 þ yhλhðωÞ
" #
 0;"ω 2 Ω; ½31
and the following relations:
G  τgk; ½32
Sh  τsk; ½33
αh ¼ 1 F Sh;G  k; ½34
X
i2Mh
Ph3  α #M  1ð Þ ¼ 2α
#M  1ð Þ
#M
: ½35
Equation [35] may be regarded as the free-entry constraint upon the equilibrium
intermediary strategy.
Proposition 9 If there exists a competitive equilibrium, with political free-entry as
defined above, then the equilibrium is in the core.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium, for a given endowment k, for which a blocking
coalition exists. Further, assume that this blocking coalition, denoted #B, is a
market in which transaction costs, production and consumption are Pareto
optimal. In such an equilibrium, consumption is equalized across all agents in
the blocking coalition: y ¼ 1 τs  τg
 
k  #Bb1
#Bb
 
2αb and cb ¼ c;"i 2 B;
EUðcbÞ > EUðchÞ, h  b: For some agent b 2 B, the following are necessary
conditions for an optimal strategy:
U
0 ðÞ
X
i2Bb
λi þ fb #Mð ÞPb2 þ μb
X
i2Bb
λi ¼ 0; ½36
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 U 0 ðÞ #Bð ÞPb1  fb #Bð ÞPb4  μb #Bð ÞPb1 ¼ 0; ½37
U
0 ðÞλb þ fb þ μbλb ¼ 0; ½38
fbk  fbF 0 ðSb;GÞð#B 1Þk2  ηbF 0 ðSb;GÞ
ð#B 1Þk2 þ 2ηbF 0 ðSb;GÞk2 ð#B 1Þ
#B
¼ 0;
½39
where fb; μb; ηb; are unknown multipliers on constraints [30], [31] and [35],
respectively. For non-intermediaries, necessary conditions for an optimum are,
U
0 ðÞλi þ fþ μλi ¼ 0; ½40
 U 0 ðÞλi  Pb2f μλi ¼ 0; ½41
U
0 ðÞPb1 þ fPb4 þ μPb1 ¼ 0; ½42
where f and μ are multipliers on constraints [26] and [27], respectively.
Equations [40] and [41] together imply that Pb2 ¼ 1, and so it follows that
Pb4 ¼ 1. Use these in the intermediary’s first-order conditions:
Pb1 ¼ 
fB
U 0 ðÞ þ μB ; ½43
and,
U
0 ðÞ ¼ f
h #Bð ÞPb2P
i2Bb
λi
 μb: ½44
Therefore,
Pb1 ¼
1
#B
 X
i2Bb
λi: ½45
Finally, we have,
Pb3 ¼ ½1 FðSb;GÞk
ð#B 2Þ
#B
: ½46
Since they are the shadow prices of dual constraints, it follows fb ¼ ηb, so
then eq. [39] implies,
1 ¼ 2F 0SðSb;GÞk
ð#B 1Þ
#B
: ½47
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Equation [47] determines the unique optimal, τ#Bs , for a given market size, #B.
Finally, the agent who decides on general capital investment will choose
1 ¼ 2F 0GðSb;GÞk
ð#B 1Þ
#B
: ½48
If this agent is a non-intermediary this follows from 0 ¼ fk þ f @Pb3@τg þ f @α@τg ; if the
agent is an intermediary, it follows from the analogue to eq. [39]. Consider, a
political manifesto that proposes a τg greater or less than that proposed by eq.
[46]. Since, the ECT is strictly concave, as is the utility function, a tax rate exists
such that the tax burden is no higher, but exchange costs are lower. That is,
consumption is strictly higher. However, an equilibrium outcome has been
constructed that is consistent with efficient, optimizing behaviour (across inter-
mediaries and non-intermediaries), that is nevertheless inconsistent with prop-
erty 3 in the definition of equilibrium. ■
Proposition 10 All core allocations can be supported as equilibria.
Proof. Assume that the optimal market size is greater than unity and less
than infinity. Then the above first-order conditions can be used directly to
construct an equilibrium that is a competitive equilibrium (since core and
competitive equilibria coincide). Since the optimal market size exists, one may
construct equilibrium markets. Hence, Properties 1 and 2 of the definition of
equilibrium are met. Finally, no set of agents will block this allocation since it
would be unable to attain a higher level of utility than under the cooperative
equilibrium. ■
A.4 Comparative Static Results
Remark 1 shows that market size and ECT allocations increase in #M.
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrates that there may exist a k
 at which two (and
no more than two) plans are optimal. It remains to characterize the relationship
between k and transaction costs in between the k
 at which the optimal market
size changes.
Proposition 11 For a given market size greater than one, (i) transaction costs are
strictly decreasing in k; and (ii) if FS and FG are inelastic with respect to S and G
respectively, optimal investments in ECT rise unambiguously in k.
Proof. Transaction costs: Recall κ ¼ k  yð Þ=k ¼ τs þ τg þ 2 #M1#M
 
1 Fð Þ. Thus,
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@κ
@k
¼ @τs
@k
þ @τg
@k
 θ @F
@S
k
@τs
@k
þ τs
 
þ @F
@G
k
@τg
@k
þ τg
  
;
¼  θk @F
@S
 1
 
@τs
@k
 θk @F
@G
 1
 
@τg
@k
 θ τs @F
@S
þ τg @F
@G
 
;
where θ ¼ 2 #M1#M
 
: And using the optimality conditions,
@κ
@k
¼ ðτs þ τgÞ=k < 0: ½49
ECT investment: Throughout, it is assumed that FSG ¼ FGS > 0; this is consistent
with the view that specific and general capital investments are positively corre-
lated. Equations [14] and [15] together imply,
FSS S;Gð Þ τs þ @τs
@k
k
 
þ FSG S;Gð Þ τg þ @τg
@k
k
  	
k þ FS S;Gð Þ ¼ 0; ½50
FGG S;Gð Þ τg þ @τg
@k
k
 
þ FGS S;Gð Þ τs þ @τs
@k
k
  	
k þ FG S;Gð Þ ¼ 0: ½51
It should be recalled that we are characterizing optimal outcomes for a given #M.
From eq. [51] it follows that @τg@k k þ τg ¼  FGkFGG 
FSG
kFGG
τs þ @τs@k k
 
; and combining
with eq. [50], one recovers an expression for the elasticity of τs with respect to k:
@τs
@k
k
τs
¼ FGFSG  FSFGG
τsk FSSFGG  FSGð Þ2
h i 1: ½52
Equation [52] allows one to check the sign of the elasticity; τsk FSSFGG  FSGð Þ2
h i
is
positive by the assumption of strict concavity and FGFSG  FSFGG is positive
since FG; FSG; FS > 0 and FGG < 0. As such, for @τs@k
k
τs
> 0, one requires that
FSG FG þ τskFSGð Þ > FGG FS þ τskFSSð Þ. The left-hand side is positive; a sufficient
condition then is that the right hand side is negative. This requires that FS is
inelastic with respect to S, i.e., that  SFSSFS < 1. Assuming the equivalent
condition holds for general capital, optimal investments in general and
specific capital are, for a given market size, strictly increasing in the level
of the endowment. ■
A.5 Numerical Solution to the Model
First, the choice of functional form for the ECT and utility function is discussed,
as is the modelling of consumption-good productivity. Next, the solution of the
model is explained and analysed holding fixed the level of the endowment. The
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solution of the model is then studied when k varies. Finally, the robustness of
the analysis to the risk aversion and ECT parameters is examined.
A.5.1 A Numerically Tractable Model
Consider a general CES form for the ECT,
F S;Gð Þ ¼ δFs Sð Þσ þ 1 δð ÞFg Gð Þσ
 1=σ
;
where δ 2 0; 1ð Þ and 1= 1 σð Þ is the constant elasticity of substitution. Functions
Fx (x ¼ s, x ¼ gÞ are continuous, decreasing and strictly concave in their only
argument; in particular, F
0
x > 0, F
00
x < 0 and Fxð0Þ ¼ 0, Fx yð Þ ! 1 as y !1,
F
0
xðyÞ ! 0 as y !1 and F
0
xð0Þ ¼ 1 for x 2 fs; gg. Fg and Fs need not be
identical functions. Thus,
Fs ¼ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γs ;
Fg ¼ 1 exp βτgk
  γg ;
where γs need not be equal to γg and where β; γs; γg 2 0; 1ð Þ. These functions and
parametric restrictions have a number of useful properties that both satisfy the
restrictions on the ECT and facilitate numerical analysis. Taking the first partial
of Fs with respect to τs one obtains,
F
0
s ¼ βkγs exp βτskð Þ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γs1
The Inada-type requirements are readily confirmed. In addition, the parameters
β; γs; γg 2 0; 1ð Þ allow one to vary the effectiveness of the ECT.22 one may use
the parameters γs; γg to make distinctions between the relative efficiency of
specific and general investments to exchange cost alleviation.
Agents have identical CRRA utility, U xð Þ ¼ x1γ  1½ = 1 γð Þ with γ > 0 being
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. For numerical tractability, we specialize
to a two-state case in which production technologies are restricted to Λ ¼ λ1; λ2f g
where λ1 < λ2 and pðλ1Þ ¼ ρ and pðλ2Þ ¼ 1 ρ.
The expected average technology for a market of size #M is given by the
following expression
E λ#M
  ¼X#M
i¼0
#M
i
 
ρ#Mið1 ρÞi ð#M  iÞλ1 þ iλ2½ 
 	
=#M; ½53
22 We use MATLAB to compute equilibria. MATLAB code and simulation output is available
from the authors.
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which is invariant to #M. One may now state the problem:
Γ ¼ arg max
#M
X#M
i¼0
#M
i
 
ρ#Mið1 ρÞiU ð1 τs  τgÞk 
ð2αÞð#M1Þ
#M
n o
	½ð#M  iÞλ1 þ iλ2=#M
	
" #
subject to
2
#M  1
#M
 
δ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γsσ þ 1 δð Þ 1 exp βτgk
  γgσ 1σσ
	 δβkγsexp βτskð Þ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γsσ1 ¼ 1;
2
#M  1
#M
 
δ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γsσ þ 1 δð Þ 1 exp βτgk
  γgσ
 1σσ
	 1 δð Þβkγgexp βτgk
 
1 exp βτgk
  γgσ1 ¼ 1;
where α ¼ 1 δ 1 exp βτskð Þ½ γsσ þ 1 δð Þ 1 exp βτgk
  γgσ 1=σn ok and
max Γf g is selected as the unique solution. The two constraints to solve simulta-
neously for the optimal τ
 ¼ τ
s ; τ
g
n o
.
A.5.2 ECT, Diversification and Utility with a Fixed Endowment
Table 2 gives the parameter values in the baseline case.
The baseline case supposes a difference in the effectiveness of S-capital and
G-capital; γg > γs and so G-capital is the less efficient.
Table 2: Baseline calibration for endogenous exchange costs.
Endowment k 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 
Specific ECT curvature γs .
General ECT curvature γg .
ECT factor β .
Weight on specific ECT δ .
CES coefficient s, 1 1s ¼ σ .
Low technology λ1 
High technology λ2 
Probability of low technology ρ .
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First the effect on optimal market size and expected utility of different levels
of ECT investment is examined. Agents choose how far (if at all) to diversify
given their residual endowment and exchange costs. Figure 6 displays expected
utility solving at optimal market size over a grid of fτs; τgg; Figure 7 gives
choices of market size.
Figures 6 and 7 make clear that over some combinations of the τs; τg

 
pairs, expected utility from diversification is higher than from not
diversifying. There is a peak in expected utility at some unique combination of
τs and τg . Clearly, market size does not peak at the peak of expected utility:
Sub-optimal institutions can induce larger markets, as was explored in
Section 6.
A.5.3 ECT, Diversification and Utility with a Varying Endowment
Using the parameter values given in Table 2, k is permitted to vary. The solution
algorithm evaluates τ
s ; τ


g
n o
using the marginal conditions for market sizes up
to some #M^ > 1 and selects the diversification level that maximizes expected
utility (increasing #M^ as required when #M^ is the utility maximizing choice).
Figure 1 gives results for these simulations.
A.5.4 Robustness to Risk Aversion and ECT Parameters
There are computational limitations to numerical analysis of the model.
MATLAB v.7, for example, will only calculate up to 170!. As can be seen in the
bottom-left panel of Figure 1, this will quickly become a limiting problem.
However, one can see the effect of changes in some other parameters. Figures
8 and 9 give results under different parameterizations of risk aversion and ECT
efficiency. In each, the central case (i.e., the middle line) reflects the parameter-
ization in Table 2. Variations on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, and on
the ECT, β, are Table 2 values multiplied by 1 16.
Figure 8 shows some variation in optimal behavior in regard to risk aver-
sion. For a given endowment, the optimal market size is decreasing in risk
aversion. Further, agents are willing to spend more on diversification (i.e.,
forming markets), as can be seen by the size of transaction costs in each case.
Figure 9 demonstrates the effect of varying the coefficient on the ECT. Reducing
β means that agents diversify at lower endowments. The size of transaction costs
is lower for a given endowment, but relatively unchanged for a given market
size. The effect of changing the exchange technology is primarily to make it
428 C. Nolan and A. Trew
Brought to you by | University of St Andrews Scotland
Authenticated | alex.trew@st-andrews.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 11/9/15 5:26 PM
feasible for agents to diversify with a lower endowment: The nature of that
diversification is little affected.
A.5.5 Distortive Institutions and the Transaction Tax
For distortive institutions, the algorithm is a simple extension of that described
above: One uses the marginal condition to find τ
s for a grid of τg and identify the
τg which obtains the two rules of thumb. For the transaction tax, the value for t
is introduced to the expression for α and agents optimize over investments and
market size taking t as given.
A.6 Figures
Figure 6: Expected utility and ECT investment.
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Figure 7: Optimal market size and ECT investment.
Figure 8: Risk aversion and endogenous exchange.
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